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ABSTRACT: This paper presents a vision for the future monitoring systems which will become normal require-
ments for management of bridges as key objects of national infrastructure in the UK and elsewhere. Rather than
being pushed by authorities and legislation, we expect that bridge managers will recognize the clear business
cases for investing in well-designed targeted monitoring. To support this proposition, the paper presents two case
studied where state-of-the-art bridge monitoring technology was used or potentially could be used to:
• Decide when to inspect and change bridge bearings, and
• Decide when to close various traffic lanes to reduce probability of overstressing bridge structural components.
1 INTRODUCTION
The UK Government’s 2011 National Infrastructure
Plan [1] signalled the need for investments of up
to £250bn over 10 years to return UK infrastructure
(transport, power, communications, water, and waste)
to world class levels of performance. Only about a
third of this can be provided from a public purse in
the UK. The rest must come from private funding -
most likely overseas sovereign investment funds. The
key problem is clearly how to attract such funding and
how to convince private finance that the investment
in the UK infrastructure is sound. Having hard data
about past and future physical performance of such
infrastructure is a way forward to justify investment
and attract private funding. In fact, it could well be the
only way forward.
Focusing on bridges as key elements of any national
infrastructure, the American Society of Civil Engi-
neers (ASCE) reports a cost of $140bn to repair
all deficient bridges in the United States [2]. Simi-
lar to the UK, whilst taxpayers in the USA can be
expected to fund a small proportion of such enor-
mous investment, as for the general infrastructure
mentioned above, the remainder must come from pri-
vate sources. The primary requirements for attracting
both private and public investment in an infrastructure
asset are managed risk and reliability of performance
in continuous operation with ever increasing service
and safety demands. Maximising return on invest-
ment requires minimisation of costs necessary to
achieve that performance – put simply getting more
from less. These requirements highlight the process
of the whole-life performance management of civil
infrastructure, a process involving decisions about
design, construction, operation, maintenance, repair,
decommissioning and demolition. Ensuring that such
decisions are informed, correct and cost effective is the
most important unsolved challenge in civil infrastruc-
ture management, attracting hundreds of researchers
and multi-£M global research investment. These peo-
ple and this investment are all trying to solve one of the
most challenging problems in civil structural engineer-
ing nowadays: how to convert testing and monitoring
data from objects of infrastructure, into knowledge
and decision making when managing infrastructure as
public assets? The problem is particularly acute for
bridges, considering their importance, and is really
about how to make sense of bridge testing and moni-
toring data. This research has yet to deliver significant
benefits in the real world due to incoherent engage-
ment with stakeholders, misdirected emphasis in the
past focusing on hardware rather than data inter-
pretation, tendency to view infrastructure assets in
isolation and the lack of a systematic approach to
link experiences between different structures. This is
a recognised problem in the USA and Federal High-
way Administration (FHWA) are still “working the
problem” [4].
Focusing on bridges, the above stated problem is
obviously not new. A paradigm shift is needed across
the board and with all stakeholders in the way how
bridges are managed from their conception to their
decommissioning. Considerable cultural changes are
needed and these will follow changes in the business
models used for managing bridges including the legal
2163
and economical framework within which public assets
like bridges operate. This applies not only to the USA,
but also to the UK, Europe and rest of the world. The
prolonged crisis which has been shaking the founda-
tions of the world economy for several years now may
well become a badly needed catalyst for the required
paradigm shift.
The continued drive for better and more endur-
ing performance from bridges is crippled by the lack
of technically sound, reliable, harmonised and eco-
nomic means for monitoring asset condition. Hence,
informed decision making by bridge managers is
severely impaired. There is potential nowadays to
transform monitoring into an enabling technology
that will revolutionise the decision making process
at all stages of an infrastructure’s life-cycle: from
design to demolition. This will yield extraordinary
reduction of the currently very high direct and indi-
rect cost of bridge performance management. The
enabling technology will also foster growth of the
infrastructure monitoring and decision support sys-
tems as a new technology sector which key role would
be to resolve the £multi-trillion global challenge of
managing deteriorating and failing infrastructure.
The aim of this invited paper is therefore to present
a case and vision for this paradigm shift, making use
of existing examples not only in civil engineering,
but also in other engineering disciplines where such
paradigm shifts happened and changed forever the
ways how industries operated.
2 FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF PROBLEM
In essence, the problem lies in the nature of civil struc-
tural engineering design and disproportionately low
level and certainty of information on which it is based
relative to the huge importance of such structures.
Because of this, in civil engineering the acceptable
level of risk of structural failure or lack of its service-
ability is at least an order of magnitude lower than for
more technologically advanced structures employed in
mechanical and aerospace engineering.There are three
key reasons for this low risk approach:
1. Civil infrastructure, in particular major long-span
bridges, underpin human society and supports
not only traffic but the daily lives of hundreds
of thousands of people and economies of linked
regions.
2. Unlike aircraft, automobiles, trains and other mass
produced machinery, which are extensively tested
as prototypes during their design, objects of civil
infrastructure including bridges are unique one-off
designs with no opportunity for extensive pro-
totype testing during design and before going
into service. As such, they are designed with
considerably reduced knowledge base and their
structural performance is poorly understood mak-
ing prediction of future behaviour difficult if not
impossible.
3. The ambiguity and degree of uncertainty related to
the actual operation of the structure, and potential
increases in load and usage in the future, force the
use of an extremely conservative design embed-
ded in design guidelines which are used instead of
prototype testing.
Notwithstanding the low-risk design methodology,
critical infrastructure items such bridges deteriorate
with time to such a point that, if no action is taken, they
become unserviceable requiring closure and repairs,
or may even collapse. To guard against this, oper-
ating authorities prescribe methods of routine, typi-
cally visual, inspection, which are slow, costly, and
subjective, hence potentially quite unreliable.
The prime example of the dubious reliability of
the current bridge inspection regime was generated
in the UK during winter 2011/2012. A sudden and
totally unexpected decision to completely close the
Hammersmith flyover in London was made on 23
December 2011 after many nights of closure of the
flyover for maintenance and visual inspection through-
out 2011. This structure takes 90,000 vehicles per
day on a strategically vital A4 route making it the
prime gateway to London, not just for the West of
the country, but also for one of the world’s largest
and busiest airports at Heathrow. This prime route
remained completely closed until 13 January 2012,
causing traffic chaos in West London for a period of
three weeks, covering the Christmas and New Year
holidays before partial reopening slightly reduced the
chaos. This situation lasted for months. Apparently, an
exceptional overloading event worsened the state of
corroded tensioning cables of the 50-year old struc-
ture so that they started snapping at a rate fast enough
for the authorities to close the flyover. This is spec-
ulation, since the structure had not been monitored
over a long enough period of time. Hence, there is
no information about ‘normal loading’ and no evi-
dence that that the dramatic closure was actually
necessary.
If anybody thought this was a chance the identifi-
cation of a new crack on the already damaged Boston
Manor viaduct forced a dramatic closure of the M4
between London and Heathrow airport – a key sec-
tion along the Olympic Route Network. This lasted
for five days in early July 2012. The new crack had
been identified in a “sensitive location” following the
final stages of the complex repairs to 15 mm long hair-
line cracks discovered by chance [5] in April in welds
on the viaduct just west of junction 2 near Hounslow.
A 7.5t weight restriction on the damaged stretch had
been imposed immediately, diverting coaches and lor-
ries onto busy local roads. The latest news is that
Boston Manor viaduct is beyond further repairs and
will be replaced.
How many similar cases and surprise total closures
are lurking within the UK fleet of key bridges on the
national transportation network?
3 THE WAY FORWARD
Interestingly, if a sudden event happened to a Roll
Royce aero-engine high above the Pacific, such as a
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lightning strike causing the engine to cough, moni-
toring sensors within the engine would automatically
record all relevant responses. This data would be trans-
mitted immediately from the aeroplane to the Rolls
Royce 24/7 operations room in Derby, UK which
continuously assesses on-line the performance of thou-
sands of working jet engines around the world. Based
on the instantaneous information from the aircraft and
the expected performance, a decision would be made
while the plane is still in the air if the engine requires
additional inspection after landing, causing delays and
financial losses. In the past and without the benefit of
permanent monitoring and data streaming and analy-
sis, this would almost certainly be the case as – similar
to bridges – safety is paramount. However, it is not
anymore due to this service based business model
of manufacturing jet engines which is based on the
on-line condition monitoring technology and instan-
taneous decision making process which Rolls Royce
mastered and commercialised around the world. The
data constantly collected from engines is invaluable to
airlines as the information enables Rolls Royce to pre-
dict when engines are more likely to fail, letting the
airlines schedule engine changes efficiently. Embrac-
ing such technology and innovation transformed Rolls
Royce from a failing company in 1971 into a cur-
rently most successful manufacturer of jet engines in
the world.
Why can’t the same business model be employed
in the management of bridges? Over many years in
the UK there has been fragmentation of construction
industry and infrastructure management characterised
by significant shift towards the use of subcontracting,
overly complex procurement approaches and uncer-
tainty of future work on key infrastructure due to lack
of vision and leadership.This has increased transaction
costs, encouraged shortermism and deterred industry
from a more strategic approach to investment in skills,
technology and innovation [6]. There are, however,
clear signs that this approach is changing offering great
opportunities to the sector, one of them being use of
permanent monitoring for effective decision making
in managing key objects of infrastructure, including
bridges.
4 MOTIVATION
Wenzel [7] noted that construction sector is conser-
vative needing strong push to motivate it to imple-
ment new technologies, such as converting monitoring
data into decision making. He outlined the following
motivation drivers:
1. Responsibility-driven motivation, stemming from
design standards, codes and guidelines which make
mandatory requirements to instrument, monitor
and interpret before deciding what to do with a
particular structure, such as bridge in operation.
This is particularly so when covering events such as
emergencies or accidents whereby monitoring data
before the event can describe what is ‘normal’ and
data after the event can be used to establish if the
structure still behaves as ‘normal’. Conventional
assessment in such situations tend to be overly con-
servative, usually to compensate for the lack of
reliability.
2. Economy-driven motivation, stemming from, say,
the need to reduce unnecessary maintenance costs,
such as expensive and not particularly reliable reg-
ular inspections, or from the need to prioritise
repairs within limited budgets which make use
of more reliable information about the remaining
life prediction of the structure. Another emerging
motivation within this category is the need for an
informed transfer of ownership from public to pri-
vate hands, whereby hard data from the structure
provides a more reliable information of the value
and longevity of the structure which is an asset
for the new owner, including their finance and
insurance organisations.
3. Curiosity-driven motivation whereby forward-
looking owners, operators and – in general – clients,
understand limitations of the current civil engineer-
ing design practise and want to learn about the
actual behaviour to help them plan future designs.
The following example will demonstrate useful-
ness of monitoring in decision making about their
operation.
5 ASSESSMENT OF BRIDGE BEARINGS
The Humber Bridge was opened in 1981. Spanning
1410 m, it held the record of the world’s longest sin-
gle spans suspension bridge until 1997. The Bridge
spans the Humber Estuary between Hessle (North) and
Barton-on-Humber (South). The Hessle side span is
280m and the Barton side span is 530 m (Figure 9).
The aerodynamically shaped bridge box girder is
discontinuous at the towers. At each end there is a
pair of ‘A-frames’ which are approximately 3.8 m tall
and 3.4 m wide (Figure 10). These bearings primarily
accommodate axial movement of the span ends, but
also permit rotation of the deck in the horizontal plane
and in the vertical plane of bridge axis and towers as the
bridge deforms under a combination of traffic, wind
and temperature effects. In total there are 12 of these
bearings, four on each span.
Figure 1. Humber Bridge instrumentation.
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Figure 2. Top: Photo showing a pair of A-frames, one for
the main and one for the side span. Bottom: The sketch shows
a pair of A-frames connected to the main span box girder.
A pair of Hilti PD4 extensometers on each end of the
main span was used to monitor the longitudinal deck
movement at the positions of the two A-frames in Fig-
ure 10 (bottom). Hence, these two sets of data provided
information to measure both longitudinal extension
and horizontal plane rotation of the bridge at its end.
The end rotation is strongly dependent on wind
speeds, as shown in Figure 11.
Ambient acceleration response of the deck is con-
tinuously recorded at midspan and used to estimate (in
real time) the natural frequencies and damping ratios of
the lowest frequency vibration modes. For the first (lat-
eral) mode of vibration, Figure 12 shows the estimated
natural frequencies as a function of the RMS of the
corresponding block(s) of acceleration data. It can be
seen that at about 0.2 m/s2 RMS the frequency gener-
ally reduces and stabilises at about 0.054 Hz for higher
levels of response. This indicates the likely non-linear
‘stick-slip’ behaviour somewhere in the structure, as
confirmed by damping estimates whereby a similar
‘unsticking’ effect is observed roughly at the same
RMS acceleration levels (Figure 13). The damping,
however, is amplitude-dependent with lower damping
corresponding to higher responses.
Figure 14 (top) shows diurnal variation of the four
horizontal displacements measured extensiometers.
Figure 14 (bottom) cumulative quasi-static hori-
zontal displacements of the four points on the two
ends of the main span which indicate that their total
travel is between 2 m and 3 m over the 10 day anal-
ysed. This means that each bearing travelled at least
Figure 3. Hessle end rotates less than the Barton end under
strong Western winds.
Figure 4. Amplitude-dependent natural frequency.
Figure 5. Amplitude-dependent damping.
3km since the opening in 1981. Not surprisingly, this
has been linked with excessive wear at the A-frames
and the likely stick-slip effect previously mentioned.
Closer inspection indicated that one of the bearings
visibly dropped and is resting on the concrete plinth
underneath due to wear of the bottom of the pin-bush
arrangement. Hence, in recent years the adequacy of
capacity and performance of the main span A-frames
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Figure 6. Diurnal variation of horizontal displacement at
the bridge ends (top). Cumulative displacement of bridge
decks over 10 days.
Figure 7.
has been questioned, based on the monitoring results
which highlighted potential issue in the structure.
6 BRIDGE DAY-TO-DAY TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT
Modern bridge monitoring technology enables on-line
access to continuous data streams, including video
data, which can be used to see live performance of
the bridge. Such systems may be used to control day-
to-day bridge usage to avoid potential overstressing of
structural elements.
Figure 15 shows a situation on a major partly loaded
suspension bridge where one half of the bridge cross
section is empty and the other is fully loaded due to a
morning rush-hour accident.
As a consequence, the on-line monitoring system
immediately registered that the stay cable tensions sud-
denly peaked whereas the natural frequency of the
system dropped suddenly (Figure 16).
Figure 17 shows a major 6-lane road bridge in
Continental Europe. The steel structural system with
inclined supports acts as a ‘shallow’ frame with end
columns rigidly connected to the structure that are
‘sensitive’ to temperature effects.
Figure 18 shows bending moment diagrams due to
partial traffic load and temperature effects of +35◦C.
A potential problem for this bridge structure is that
Figure 8. On line monitoring system picked up sudden ten-
sions in stay cables and drop in the natural frequency of the
bridge structure, which could be set up to trigger alert when
managing traffic in cases of frequent bridge congestions.
Figure 9. Major road steel bridge.
Figure 10. Critical load case – partial traffic loading com-
bined with extreme temperature effects.
the combination of live load as shown in Figure 18
(top) with winter temperature of −35◦C will make
sure that the two bending moments arithmetically add
at the bottom of the vertical end column which is
fixed.
This is potentially unsafe situation which can be
managed by a permanent monitoring system which
would monitor temperature and strain/stresses at the
bottoms of the end columns. In case of low temper-
atures and if the strain readings require, the traffic
over this vital bridge can be reduced, reducing the
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risk of a potentially unsafe situation that would oth-
erwise require prevention by disruptive and expensive
remedial work on the end columns.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a vision for the future monitor-
ing systems which will become normal requirements
for management of bridges as key objects of national
infrastructure in the UK and elsewhere. Rather than
being pushed by authorities and legislation, we expect
that bridge managers will recognize the clear busi-
ness cases for investing in well-designed targeted
monitoring.
To support this proposition, the paper presents three
case studies where state-of-the-art bridge monitoring
technology was used or potentially could be used to
manage the following key aspects of bridge operation
and maintenance:
• Deciding when to inspect and change bridge bear-
ings, and
• Deciding when to close various traffic lanes to
reduce probability of overstressing bridge structural
components.
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